the imported input. The import licenses cannot be sold or transfemed and, moreover, resale r=trictions apply to the imported goods. This nontransferability has often been supported by the use of foreign exchange controls that relatively allocate foreign exchange to individual firms. The swond typical feature that prova significant is the tendency for bureaucrats to accept only a proportion of license applications (or of foreign exchange applications), rejating others, even though the rej mted applications are essentially no different. This wuld be viewed as inequitable for those firms, the non-license holders, that fail to r~eive any import quota. However, although domestic welfare is reduced if domestic production costs remain constant, a licensing scheme incorporating both featur= has some perhaps surprising implications for the size of the intermediate-good industry created by import replacement. Specifically y, for a given import quota, such a scheme can boost the domestic outputs of both the intermediate and final products above the levels that would be achievable with marketable quota licenses or an equally restrictive, equivalent tariff.
To achieve tis increase in output requires that the firm-level quota allocated to each license holder be raised above the level of the input the firm would purchase if it had to pay the higher domestic price. This reduces the marginal valuation of a license to a license holder (the value of being able to import one more unit) below the marginal valuation of a non-license holder,
given by the excess of the domestic price over the import price of the input.
Thus a "dual-price" market is created in which license holders face a lower implicit price or marginal cost for own use of the input causing them to use their Wnder pure competition, use of marketable licenses is equivalent to a tariff for the same import level. quota allocation so as to produce a higher output than do non-license holder<.
By contrast, iflicenses were marketable, orifatariff were used, this equalimarginal costs across firms, reducing the output of license holders to the same lower level as non-license holders. Since aggregate imports are unchanged, domestic production of the input falls together with final-good output.
Since the distortion caused by the import quota reduces final-good output, raising this output is beneficial. However, output is increased by the use of non-transferable licenses only by driving a wedge between the valuations of different groups of users. This amounts to a further distortion, which tends to lower welfare. Specifically the reduced marginal value of an import license to license holders arising from an increase in the firm-level quota, directly lowers the value of quota rents. Since, for a given aggregate level of imports, a higher firm-level quota raises the proportion of non-license holders with no choice but to buy domestic, it also raises domwtic production of the input. As a consequence, licensing schemes associated with larger increases in domestic output also cause a greater loss in quota rents. Indeed, output is highest under a "zero-rent" licensing scheme in which license holders are allocated a quota equal to what they would import under free trade and no quota rents are generated.
It is comforting for the standard prescription in favor of marketable licenses that this loss in rents is sufficiently large" that, at least in a small 3A dual-price market could also arise if only exporters can import intermediate inputs duty free up to some limit and resale is prevented. SW Rodrik (1994) for examples relating to Taiwan and Korea.
"That quota rents are large is supported by a number of studies (see Feenstra (1992) ) showing that the loss of quota rents is a significant part of the cost of a VER. country, perfatly competitive setting, the use of marketable quota licenses always dominates bureaucratic allocation when import prices and domestic production costs remain constant. However, if foreign firms would anyway extract the quota rents5 as occurs when a VER (voluntary export restraint) is the alternative, a "zero-rent" licensing scheme bwome-s optimal in a broad class of . Viewing this last rtiult in the light of the thwry of domestic distortion&, it is not so surprising that a seemingly inefficient regulation preventing the formation of a market in licenses can be beneficial in a third best world in which there is both an import restriction and a domestic loss of quota rent.
Neverthel=s, since VERS are quite common, this result could have some empirical relevance.
A further and perhaps more significant result arises when the domestic costs of intermediate-good production fall with expansion of industry output.
Consideration of decreasing costs is natural in this context, since the existence of external wonomies arising from hands on learning by doing is typically part of the infant industry justification for protection'. Given the central result that non-tradable quota licens= can raise domestic output, one might expect that the =ond best optimal policy would be to institute a bureaucratic scheme at some sufficiently large rate of decrease in cost. What is perhaps surprising is that this r=ult holds for any, even a very small, rate of decrwse in costs. This suggests s is more likely if the foreign suppliers are imperfectly competitive. Imperfwt competition in input supply would not fundamentally change the output rmlts. 6S= Bhagwati, Ramaswami and Srinivasan (1969) . 'Gains in experience by workers and managers are not fully captured by individual firms since personnel are fr~to move to other firms or start up new firms.
that the efficiency argument in favor of marketable quota licenses has something of a knife-edge character.
The above discussion indicates that in a second best context there are legitimate efficiency arguments for the use of bureaucratic licensing schemes and it is possible that policy makers had these ideas in mind when choosing the bureaucratic route. However, these arguments abstract from other costs associated with bureaucratic schemes such as rent-sinkings and the cost of the bureaucracy itself. Since, in addition, inducd changes in the structure of the industry, such as merger between license holders and non-license holders, could undo the output gains in the long run, there is no implied policy conclusion in favor of bureaucratic schemes.
At a more fundamental level, the paper contributes a new theoretical argument showing that in a setting where the quantity of an input is restricted, the use of licensing regulations to create different prices for different groups of users can at least partly be understood on the basis of output effwts in the industry. For example, suppose that a limit is set on the total amount of a polluting chemical, such as refrigerants containing CFC'S, that can be used in the products of a particular industry. The daire to limit losses in output and employment might then help explain the use of command and control methods with different levels of enforcement across firms as opposed to issuing marketable permits.
Despite widespread use, as shown by the surveys of trade practices in Trela and Whalley (1991) and Erzan et al (1989) , non-transferable quota licens= have received little attention in the academic literature. Trela and Whalley 'Spencer (1996) extends the model to consider rent-seeking in the context of "Law of the Similars" type schemes in which imports are permitted only if they are sufficiently different from locally produced products.
(1991) also estimate the costs imposed by non-transferable export quota licenses in "locking out" newer lower cost producers. In Anderson (1987) , the nontransferability of export quotaa between counties reduces world welfare because it prevents arbitrage in a situation of demand uncertain y. Finally, Krishna and Tan (1996) sufficiently restrictive to induce domestic production of the input, a license will command a price~= rD -P. Consequently, the marginal cost P of the input to (previous) non-license holders is unchanged and hence the output produced by these firms is also unchanged. Since X rises to equal -y, this gives rise to a "unified market" in which license holders also face a marginal opportunity cost (F + X) of production equal to f'. Thus license holders sell licenses so as to reduce output from~to y(fl (see Fig. 1 X, labor L and a spwific factor T, which could represent the limited pool of managers with the necessary talent to operate a firm in the industry or, alternatively, some scarce natural resource such as land of a particular type.
Capital equipment X is producd domestically by a competitive industry using labor alone at an average cost P and, since P > P, it would all be imported under free tradeii. To close the model, a second (traded) final good Z, also produced by a competitive industry with labor alone, acts w a numeraire. Sincẽ am indebted to a refer~for sugg=ting Fig. 1 and this was of explaining the issue. lolf p = p(y) where p' < 0, domestic output Y would still incr~se under "dual-price" schemes, but by a smaller amount. The terms of trade effect from the fall in p would raise welfare if the good is imported but reduce welfare to the extent that the good is exported. llDomestic ad forei~produc~units of the input X are homogenmus.
labor has a constant marginal product in producing Z, the domestic wage, denoted by w, remains constant.
The fact that only a fixed quantity P of the specific factor is available in the domestic economy creat~diminishing returns to labor, making the aggregate output of good Y determinate, even given the small country assumption. me analysis is simplified in the main text by assuming that each final-good producer requires just one (lumpy) unit of the specific factor, which becomes sunk at the time of entry the industry. This fixes the number n =õ f domestic final-good producers and also provides a mechanism by which firms can prove they have a legitimate commitment to the industry so as to qualify to apply for an import license. Also for simplicity, production of Y requires the intermediate good X be UA in fixed proportion]z, with the units chosen so that one unit of X is required for each unit of Y. Hence, assuming that labor exhibits diminishing marginrd productivity when combined with one unit of T and using subscripts to repr=ent partial derivatives, the production function is given by If all final-good producers receive import licenses (i.e. ifs = 1), then the marginal value of a quota license is the same across firms, giving rise to the 13Prohibitive fines could be imposed for non compliance. In the context of this model, all actions are observable so all violators would be caught.
same total levels of production as would be achieved if licensfi were marketable14. This correspondence betw~n the bureaucratic scheme at s = 1 and a marketable license scheme, makes it a convenient base for comparison.
Also, althoughs is treated as a continuous variable, this is not strictly nmessary.
For example, if there were just 4 equal size final-good firms, s could take the values 1/4, 1/2, 3/4 and 1, which is sufficient variation to show the r~ults.
However, if a firm were able to monopolize the market by cornering the entire supply of the s~ific factor, then with only one license holder, s ordy takes the value 1 and the model collapses.
There are thr~stages of decision for final-good producers. In stage 1, after the government announces the license allocation process together with the valu~ofs and~, firms decide whether to enter the domestic final-good industry taking into account the equilibrium outcomes of subsequent stages. To enter each firm must purchase one unit of the spwific factor which is available at a market clearing price. In stage 2, producers can choose to apply for import licenses and license allocation takes place as announced. In stage 3, the intermediate good is
imported and producd domestically, the final good is produced and revenue-s are distributed.
Finn Level Decisions
This section develops the effwts of the bureaucratic licensing schemes on the decisions of firms as to entry and output. Consideration is first given to the third stage competitive output equilibrium, before moving back to the limnse application stage and the decision to enter the market.
The respective outputs of a final-good producer with and without an l%e licens= could be allocated to firms and then sold or be initially sold by the government. For the subsequent analysis, attention is restricted to the region of interest in which the firm-level quota is binding (i.e. s 2 Q. In this region, using (4.4) and (4.6), license-holder output can be expressed as
Similarly, the marginal quota rent X can be expressed as15:
As can be -n from (4.8) using (3.2), an increase ins aboves raises the value of A: i.e --N = C"(y)y/s >0 for s G~, min [s, l] ].
(4.9)
In demonstrating that the bureaucratic scheme can increase domestic output, an important step is to show that firma failing to obtain a license will nevertheless always choose to produce. LettiDg Pn -r" for notational convenience, this result follows b=ause the stage 3 variable profit 15Since C'@(S, Q)) = p -P from (4.3) and (4.2), we have A@,Q) = f -# and using (4.4), this implies~(s,Q) = F -P for s E [~,1] . me other part of (4.8) follows from (4.5a) and yF =~. Since the gain G is always positive, all fial-good producers make applications for import licenses.
In stage 1, firms competing to enter the industry bid up the price of the spwific factor to the point that E{T} = O, which from (4.11) and (4.13) impli= a = V(fl + sG. (4. 14)
Hence the spwific factor earns rents UT = nV(P) + nsG where 'P = n. Firms that subsequently obtain an import license earn positive profits, but non-license holders do not fully recover their sunk investment in the specific factor: i.e. using (4.11), (4.12) and (4.13),
(4.15)
Irnuort Licensing Schemes and AQQreQate Dommtic OutDut
As previously mentioned, a critical distinction is between "dual-price" licensing schemes and licensing schemes in which there is a "unified market" for the input (marginal costs are equaliti). Under a dual-price scheme, the value X of an additional license to a license holder is below the value y = f -f to a non-license holder and there are some non-license holders (i.e. s < 1). Since A < rD -rF is equivalent to PF < P, license holders then face a lower marginal opportunity cost for own use of the input and hence produce a higher output than domestically under a dual-price licensing scheme, but not when licenses are marketable, it again follows that marketability reduces the output of both goods.
As for part (ii) of the Proposition, since the proportion of firms rweiving import licenses is at the minimum necessary to exhaust the total import quota Q, a zerorent licensing scheme maximizes the proportion of non-license holders and hence the aggregate domestic output of the input. Also, since Q is unaffected by the licensing scheme, domestic production of the final good is also at a maximum.
At a deeper level, a dual-price licensing scheme raises domestic output by increasing the overall intensity of use of the specific factor. When the firmlevel quota allocation exceeds the quantity of the input the firm would use at the domestic price I-O, this induces the firm to hire more labor so as to use the spwific factor more intensively than it would as a non-license holder. At the extreme, under a zero-rent licensing scheme, firms winning the quota lottery are allocated a quota that enables them to operate at the same labor to specific factor ratio as at free trade. In effect, non-marketability makes the quota allocation lumpy, which raises output by forcing license holders to increase their intensity of use of the specific factor so as to use all of the quota allocation. A quota set at Q = A(fl in Fig. 4 marks the point at which domestic production of the intermediate good commences under a marketable license scheme. Any further reduction in the quota is matched by an equal increase in domestic production of the input, with the result that final-good output remains constant at A(rO), the output corrtiponding to a prohibitive quota. Essentially, once the input is produced domestically under a unitid scheme, the size of the quota has no effect on final-good output since all producers use the domestically produced input at the margin. By contrast, ifs = S, firms shifted into the nonlicence holder category by a reduction in Q produce 1=s than they did as licence holders, causing aggregate output of the final good to continue to fall. Although more of the input is produced dom~tically, the increase is less than the reduction in the quota. Finally, at a prohibitive quota, Q = O, the licensing scheme becomw irrelevant and the domestic outputs of both the intermediate and final products are equaliti at A(fl.
Welfare Comparison
In developing the welfare effects, three different settings are considered. The first is the case already considered in which the prices P and F are constant. With rF unaffected by the quota, all quota rents go to the domestic country. In the swond setting, foreign suppliers are assumed to raise #in r~ponse to the quota so as to collwt all quota rents. Finally, consideration is given to the possibility that the domestic intermediate-good industry experienc~decreasing costs causing P to fall as output expands. In this second best context caused by the quota, the beneficial output effects arising from dual-prices are gained by generating a second distortion in which the marginal evaluation of a license by license holders is reduced below that of non-license holders. This causes a loss of quota rents, which, with rF constant, is suffered by the domestic country in the form of a lower return u to the specific factor. The increased output arising from dual-prica tends to raise the return u, but domestic welfare falls because the loss of quota rents dominates.
In effwt, the loss in quota rents is (inefficiently) translated into higher domestic output, causing domestic welfare to fall.
But what if the dom=tic country would not enjoy the quota rents?
Consider a setting in which a foreign monopoly supplies the input. If the monopolist can price discriminate betwan countries, profit maximization would lwd it to extract all the quota rent by raising its export price, denoted IF, to wual pF = # + X. Thus, as first shown by Shibata (1968) and explored by Krishna (1990) , a government that attempted to auction import licenses with prices determined endogenously would fmd that the price of a license is zero and the auction raises no revenue. Setting A = O in (4. 12) and (6.2), it follows that without quota rents, domestic welfare, denoted~(s,Q), is given bỹ 
P~fi
Since dG/ds = -~(dP/ds) it follows from (6.4) that for
and dW/ds = O otherwise. Since V'@~= -y@F) from (4.10) and (4.5a), this implies V"ti~= -y'@~>0 and hence that V(fl
Now combining (6. 8) with (6.7) and using d7/ds =~= C"(~)~/s from (4.9),
we obtain d~/ds < -n~C''~)yD <0 for s G~, min~,l]]. in the dual-price region s G~,min~, l]). Since increases ins above 3 have no effect on output, + = P(s) is constant for s E [6, 1] .
If the quota is below A(f), Proposition 5 shows the strong result that any reduction in rD, however small, shifi the optimal licensing scheme into the dual-price region. Since it is assumed that the domestic country would get the quota rents, this provides a case in which bureaucratic allocation of nontransferable licens~actually dominates the use of marketable quota licensw or an equivalent tariff.
Proposition 5: Suppose the domestic count~captures the quota rents (F is constant) and Q 4 A(P). If P declines with industry output, then domestic
welfare is increased (relative to using marketable licenses) by reducing the proportion of licenses issued to the point that a dual-price domestic market is crealed. We~are is at a muimum under some dual-price bureaucratic scheme.
kfi From (4.12), using (3 .2) and dV(~(s))/ds = -yD(dP/ds) from (4.10) and (4.2), we obtain dG/ds = -A~/s + yD(dP/ds). Hence from (6.2) using ny(fl = Although a temporary quota could be justified on the basis of the infant industry argument for protection when there is a cost reducing externality, the learning by doing or other process that underlays the externality n~s to lwd to a permanent reduction in costs sufficient to bring domestic costs down to world levels so the industry can eventually compete.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown that when an import quota is imposed on an 'Wowever, it is likely to be substantially more difficult to monitor numerous final-good consumers to prevent resale (and the break down of the dual-price market) than it is to monitor final-good producers. growth performance. This is particularly the case if by forgoing imports, the developing country fails to take advantage of new technology and new ideas being developed abroad. However, Romer (1992) Maintenance of a dual-price licensing scheme requires not only that the authorities be successful in preventing resale of the licenses and the imports themselves, but also that license holders not be able to access the rwourcw of non-license holders through long run changes in the structure of the industry, such as merger. As modelled, this latter problem is reflected in the need to prevent reallocation of the specific factor from non-license holders to license holders. If over time the specific factor were to depreciate substantially or if licence holders were able to merge with non-license holders, combining their supplies of the specific factor, this would cause the eventual collapse of dual prices. A new lottery for licenses would then be required to again create dual-'See for example, Rodrik (1994) and Lee (1994) for development of this argument.
prices and the associated higher output. However, given the political difficulties likely involved in taking licenses away from established firms, the final outcome could easily be a break down in the dual-price market, yet the maintenance of an expensive bureaucracy which encourages rent-swking and stifles genuine new initiatives.
In summa~, it is important to emphasis that this paper does not advocate the use of bureaucratic import licensing rul=. Rather the idea is to help explain why such practices may have come into effect, particularly in an environment, as was the case 20 years ago, in which import substituting investment in capital equipment was viewed as a main road to economic development in manufacturing.
AuRendix A: Firms of Different Sizes
This Appendix develops a more general model in which firms can vary in size because of different levels of investment Tj for j~[1.
.n] in the specific factor. The production function becomes
where f(L,TJ) is assumed to be linearly homogeneous. Since most features of the model are unchanged from the "main model" in the text, I will mostly just highlight the new features.
Letting nQ denote the number of license holders, each final-good firm faces an equal probability s = nQ/n of receiving an import license as before.
However, the firm-specific quota, denoted~is set proportionate to firm j's investment T in the specific factor. Noting that Q now represents the planned or expected level of imports of X and that 6 = Q/s~is a constant, we havẽ = j(s,Q,Tj) = 6Tj for~= Q/sT,
where, as in the main model,~,(s,Q,Tj) = -~/s < 0.
The actual quantity of imports denoted by Q' =~~~= 6~~Tj will vary depending on the actual sizes of the firms picked in the lottery.
However, if Tj =~/n is constant across firms, then ( Using a superscript j to index variables that depend on~, linear homogeneity allows the production function yij = f(Ej,Tj) to be expressed in the form yij = f(fi, l)Tj where (i -Lij/Tj denotes the labor to specific factor ratio.
Hence, supposing that firms purchase quipment from only one source, the profit of firm j using equipment from source i for i = F,D can be written as
where f~f < 0 (from linear homogeneity) implies Tij is strictly concave in Pi. At the stage 3 competitive equilibrium, maximizing xjD taking the prices p and P as given, a non-license holder would increase its labor input to the point that fD satisfies the first order condition
which defines lD as a function fD = 1(fl in equilibrium. It is important to notice that lD is independent of T. Firm j's equilibrium level of output is then given by
Next, deftig S to satisfy~@, Q,Tj) = y(P,Tj), it follows, using (A2) and ( where (d~/dA)X = O. As can be seen from (A6a&b), lF can be written w fF = 1~~where h and hence P F~rF + x is independent of~. Hence,~alogous to (A5), each license holder j produces output
where f '~F) = (ff)z/wfff < 0. Now letting s satisfy j(s, Q,Tj) = y(P,Tj), it follows from (A2) and (A7) 
Since firm j gains @ > 0 with probability s > 0, its expected profit, denoted E{rj}, from making a license application always exceeds its known profit mm 2LIfvariation in Tj makes Q* # Q, actual output XDA =~~a y(+,Tj) can differ from X" = E{XDA}. 
and, from (Al 1), using (A9), (A1O) and (A13), firm j's expwted profit can be 
where, from (A14), dGj/dTj = @/Tj = W(MF -MD) + X6 > 0 is independent of Tj. Hence it follows that d2E{r}/(dTj)2 = O making the actual level of Tj and the equilibrium number of firms n indeterminate. At free trade, setting PF = rF, X = O and s = 1 in (A15) implies that MF = cr/w, which is just the familiar result that the MRS equals the factor price ratio. However a binding import quota causing 1 > 0 distorts this efficiency condition.
Using (A13) and dd/d~= Gj/Tj in (A15), each firmj pays UT = sd + V(P;Tj) for the spwific factor, reducing E{mj} to~ro (-(A14)) and generating rents for the specific factor equal to UT =~-, [s@ + v(r";Tj) ].
The equilibrium profits of firm j are as in (4. 15): i.e. from (A9) and (A1O),~j = (l-s)@ >0 for s < 1 and Tq = -s@ <0 for s >0. Thus it is not hard to S= that adjusting for the indexing of variables by~, all the subsequent welfare results also hold for this expanded model.
Importance of the Sunk Nature of the Specific Factor
To see the role played by the assumption that T is sunk prior to license allocation, suppose that licenses are instead allocated in stage 1 prior to the choice of T in stage 2 and stage 3 is unchanged. Since no commitment has been made to production, all license applicants are identical. Thus in stage 1, the government could allocate~= Q/ns to a proportion s of the n applicants as in 
From (A17), non-license holders set T" > 0 if and only if MD = MF, which implies (see (A12)) that markets are unified with PF = r". Since pF < r" for all s when A(fl < Q < A(fl, u is then too high for non-license holders to enter and T" = O. License holders, using imports alone, then produce the same output as ifs = 1. If pF = r" when Q < A(r"), then non-license holders enter setting TD > 0 so as to achieve the same labor to specific factor ratio as license holders (i.e t~q = f(r") from (A12)), but they earn zero profit (see (A16)). In both cases, total output is the same as if licenses were marketable. Hence trading in the specific factor prior to the allocation of quota licenses gives rise to the same outcome as if the licenses themselves were tradeable.
